

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

**ROLES FOR NATIONAL GUARD COMPONENTS:  
CURRENT THOUGHTS AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES**

by

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## *Preface*

As a traditional citizen-airman with sixteen years in the Air National Guard, I have personally experienced the changing unit dynamics involved with the increased use and reliance of the Guard in support of military and civil needs. Based on this, I thought it would be interesting to learn about which directions and future roles were being considered for the Nation's Reserve Components. This paper used the findings of the Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 as a basis for my study and expands a bit further by considering thoughts of military leaders and civil educators who have been, or who still are instrumental in, developing new ideas or guiding policy regarding future uses of the military.

I would like to acknowledge the Maine Air National Guard for allowing me the opportunity to attend the Air Command and Staff College in residence and explore this issue in an academic environment. I would like to especially note the efforts of Lt Col Allison Palmer for her motivation and efforts in establishing and presenting the Total Force course. Her efforts to educate and enlighten will surely help to remind all of us in the profession of arms that we truly are one team, and interdependent upon each other for future success in the challenges to come.

*Abstract*

The Reserve Forces are increasingly being used as augmentation to the Active Duty forces, which in turn, have become increasingly reliant on the capabilities and cost savings inherent with Reserve Forces use. The Reserve Components have made great strides in becoming integrated within the national defense structure over the past forty years; yet, world security dynamics, downsizing of the military force, and declining budgets will force our nation to become more innovative and efficient in using the full spectrum of limited military resources. Do we risk inappropriate or overuse of the National Guard? Current thoughts on future use of the National Guard, and in particular, what roles they might best be used in are the topics for this paper. It reviews some of the findings contained within the Reserve Component Employment Study 2005, which focuses on the three main themes of homeland defense, small-scale contingency operations, and major theater wars. Nontraditional military use of the National Guard forces, that is the ways in which the forces are being used within the social and domestic environment, are also presented and examined.

## **Part 1**

### **Introduction**

*Men, you are all marksmen—don't one of you fire until you see the whites of their eyes.*

—Israel Putnam

With those words, Israel Putnam prepared his men for battle with the British troops at Bunker Hill in one of many battles fought with the aid of the colonial and state militias which eventually led to the end of European control over the colonies and North America.

Since those early days, the “militia” concept has evolved into the current modern day National Guard force comprised of part-time volunteers, and full-time state and federal workers. Together these people, units, and associated equipment represent a well-trained and equipped force, prepared and capable of responding to a variety of scenarios in support of state and national requirements. As it stands today, the Guard has evolved into an indispensable part of our Nation’s military force structure, and is being increasingly tasked for operational support missions and in augmentation roles to Active Duty forces.

The current National Security Strategy of “engagement” will require our nation’s leaders and population to accept greater global U.S. involvement in small-scale contingencies, peacekeeping/peacemaking operations and humanitarian assistance around the world. For a variety of political and economic reasons, reserve force components will have an increasingly larger role within the military structure tasked to accomplish these missions. Precisely what role

and to what extent the Reserve forces will have in the future force mix is a topic worthy of serious debate at the national public level, and one we as military leaders must be prepared to articulate.

## **Historical Perspective**

The history of the citizen-soldier dates back to well before the revolutionary time. The first English settlers brought their cultural influences and English military ideas with them to this continent. One of these ideas included the reliance on a militia of citizen-soldiers who had the obligation to assist in national defense.<sup>1</sup> The first colonists in Virginia and Massachusetts had to rely on themselves for their own defense. Correspondingly, America's first permanent militia regiments were organized by the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1636 and today's National Guard is the direct descendent of the militias of the thirteen original English colonies. The colonial militias were first used for war in 1637, when the English settlers in New England went to war against the Pequot Indians of Connecticut. This was to be one of many of the Indian wars fought in North America over the next two centuries, and the British tapped the frontier fighting experience gathered by the colonial militias during these early wars during the French and Indian war of 1754. To augment their forces in North America, the British recruited regiments of "Provincials" from the militia to help with their efforts against the French and Indians.<sup>2</sup> Ironically, it was just a short period of time until the colonists and their militias were pitted against the British troops during their struggle for independence. While in command of the Continental Army, George Washington, a former militia colonel, recruited heavily from the militia to fill his regiments. When called out for specific battles, the local militias also provided crucial augmentation to Continental troops, who were generally outnumbered and spread thin as the revolutionary war progressed.<sup>3</sup> Recognition in the importance of the role played by the

militia in winning the Revolutionary War is evident in the Constitution and the articles and the amendment regarding militias and the right to bear arms.<sup>4</sup>

The basis for the present day National Guard is the organized militia as described in the Constitution of the United States. In essence, to have any hopes of attaining ratification, the Constitution became a compromise between the federalist and anti-federalists with respect to the defense needs of the fledgling new nation, the rights of the people, and their respective opposing viewpoints. Federalists believed in a strong central government and a large standing Army with a militia firmly under control of the Federal government, while anti-federalists believed in the power of the states and small or non-existent regular Army with state controlled militias. Consequently, power was divided and the President was given control of all military forces as Commander-in-Chief, and Congress was provided the sole power to impose the taxes to pay for military forces and the right to declare war. In the militia, power was divided between the individual states and the Federal government. The Constitution gave the states the right to appoint officers and supervise training, and the Federal government was granted the authority to impose standards. In the final analysis, the Constitution established the legal basis<sup>5</sup> for the foundation of a dual military system comprised of citizen-soldiers within the state militias, and a professional federal military force.

In 1792, Congress passed the “Calling Forth and Uniform Militia Act.” According to Dr. Gross “this legislation defined the basic status of the militia for the next 111 years.”<sup>6</sup> The act required all males between the ages of 18 to 45 to enroll in the regular federal militia, allowed for a volunteer militia, and with later modifications permitted the President to mobilize the militia and provide limited federal money for weapons and ammunition.<sup>7</sup> However, the 1792 law did not require inspections by the Federal government, or penalties for non-compliance with

the law. As a result, in many states the "federal" militia went into a long decline; once-a-year musters were often poorly organized and ineffective.<sup>8</sup> This, in conjunctions with other social factors, led to a rise in prominence of the state's volunteer militia and their associated strong state and political affiliations.

Though state militias were required and in most cases, very effective, during military engagements of the 19th century, there were "growing pains" associated with their use. During the War of 1812, some governors withheld their militias from federal control, and some Ohio militiamen refused to conduct military operations into Canada.<sup>9</sup> Militia units made up 70 percent of the U.S. Army that fought the Mexican War in 1846 and 1847. During this first American war fought entirely on foreign soil, there were questions as to the constitutionality of foreign service for the militia (a question that reappeared during the Spanish American War), which resulted in militiamen being demobilized before participating in combat.<sup>10</sup> Also, for a variety of reasons (e.g., militiamen outranking regulars, sloppy and poorly disciplined volunteers), there was considerable friction between regular Army officers and militia volunteers.<sup>11</sup> In addition, the Mexican War established a military pattern whereby "regular officers provided military know-how and leadership and citizen-soldiers provided the bulk of the fighting troops."<sup>12</sup> By the end of the 19th century many states began to rename their militia "National Guard." "The name was first adopted before the Civil Was by New York State's militia in honor of the Marquis de Lafayette, hero of the American Revolution, who commanded the 'Garde Nationale' in the early days of the French Revolution."<sup>13</sup>

Also, by the close of the century, the need for military reform led to compromise between the group politicians and Army officers who wanted a much larger full-time Army, and a country which never had (tolerated) a large regular Army in peacetime and was unwilling to pay for it.

Further, states-rights advocates in Congress defeated plans for a totally Federal reserve force in favor of reforming the militia, or National Guard.<sup>14</sup>

A compromise and revised framework for the military and the reserve (which still exists) was effectively achieved with the passage of the Militia Act of 1903, and the National Defense Acts of 1916 and 1920.<sup>15</sup> This legislation allowed for increased modernization of and increased Federal control over the National Guard. This also linked Federal funding to National Guard unit strength levels, organization, and inspections by Regular Army officers. Guardsmen were required to attend drills and annual training, for which they were paid. The state militias' were guaranteed status as the Army's primary reserve force, and all states were required to rename their militia "National Guard". As a result of problems incurred in utilization of the Guardsmen during World War I, further legislation in 1933 created a dual legal status for Guardsmen in federal service. Essentially Guardsmen would carry two appointments, one in the armed forces of the United States and one in the state.<sup>16</sup>

In 1947, with the creation of a separate branch of service for the Air Force, the Air National Guard also came into being. According to Dr. Gross, the Air National Guard came about as a separate reserve component of the Air Force primarily as a result of politics in the aftermath of World War II. Despite the Army Air Force (AAF) leaders firm convictions that citizen-soldiers could not operate complex modern weapons without postmobilization training, AAF leadership fell into line with the thoughts of General George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff who believed that the postwar military establishment would be based on citizen-soldiers and not a large professional army. Also the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) with its political strength was lobbying to ensure that the National Guard would have a place in the postwar US military structure. Due to a combination of these two factors, and the need to

avoid weakening their case for a separate service, AAF leaders agreed as a matter of political expediency, to the creation of the Air National Guard.<sup>17</sup>

From this period forward, the National Guard continued to make contributions to the defense of the nation despite marginal funding, limited and marginal equipment acquired from the active component forces (AC), and contending with the “second class status” bias towards the reserve component forces (RC) pervasive throughout the AC force. Not until Melvin Laird’s concept of a total force was codified into law did some of these issues have a chance of being addressed.

## **Milestones and Changes**

The 1970s saw three dramatic changes that affected all Guardsmen: the implementation of the Total Force Policy, the beginning of the all-volunteer military and the increased service of minorities. The end of the draft in 1973 ushered in a period of tremendous change for the U.S. military.<sup>18</sup> Without conscripted manpower and under pressure to cut costs, top military leaders realized that military strategy could not be accomplished without the use of the Guard as a supplement to the active duty and that they must make better use of their reserve components. Though the Air Guard had been integrated into the workings of the Air Force since the mid-1950s, it is primarily the Total Force policy which has resulted in more missions, equipment, and training opportunities for the RC since its inception twenty-seven years ago.

The Total Force policy promulgated by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger in 1973 is considered a milestone in the evolution of the RC. In essence, the policy brought the RC “into full partnership with the AC for purposes of deterring war, providing defense and waging war.”<sup>19</sup> Implicit in this policy is the effort to fund, properly train and equip and use the RC in an effective manner. Augmentation to and support for the policy in the years since its inception has

followed and was reiterated in a 1997 memo signed by Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen, on integration of the Reserve and Active components, and in his latest annual report to the President and the Congress.<sup>20</sup>

With respect to diversity in the Guard, social changes underway in the '60s and '70s were also eventually mirrored in the National Guard, particularly in its gender and ethnic composition. As the armed services began expanding opportunities for women in the '70s, the National Guard saw a corresponding rise in the number of women recruits from slightly more than 1 percent in 1974, to approximately 15 percent in 1996.<sup>21</sup> Similarly, during the same period, the minority representation increased from about 4.4 percent to approximately 12 percent.<sup>22</sup> Undoubtedly the increasing minority participation in this time frame benefited the National Guard with being able to meet recruiting and retention goals. But more importantly, the Guard more closely represented the demographics of the society they served, which is important for maintaining support of the local community. This support is crucial when considering the current and future increased use of the Guard.

## **Current Operations and Use**

Today, the Guard is very active both at home and abroad. In the recent years, the Guard deployed soldiers to more than 70 countries for missions and training while supporting more than 300 emergency call-ups (annual basis) domestically.<sup>23</sup> The Guard and Reserve comprise almost half of our total military capability today and participate in every region of the world and contingency over the most recent decade.

The traditional, most often thought of role for the National Guard, is likely based in the use of the Guard during the civil unrest of the sixties when many Governors depended on the Guard to maintain domestic order during the civil rights marches and anti-Vietnam protests. Indeed,

this perception has its roots beginning with the militia put down of a farmers rebellion (Shay's Rebellion), and the use of the National Guard during the industrial workers riots in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>24</sup> More recently the use of Guard assets to assist in natural disasters; hurricanes in Florida and Hawaii, riots in Los Angeles, and demonstrations in Seattle has drawn attention to the National Guard's role in local communities. That role has increased as the Guard, active for years in drug interdiction and eradication efforts, institutes new and innovative community outreach programs (detailed later in this paper) such as ChalleNGe and StarBase.

The collapse of the Soviet Union has forced the United States to change the basis for planning the size and content of U.S. forces. The National Security Strategy of the Cold War years was one of containment and deterrence, which depended on a large military force capability to counter the Soviet threat and communist expansion. With the end of the Cold War, (and our nation's desire for a peace dividend) the growing military assistance to fledgling democracies, and increasing participation in a peacekeepers' role under the policy of engagement the active duty military forces finds itself shorthanded in terms of both manpower and funding. Consequently, as a result of AC downsizing, and U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), the Pentagon has once again started to depend on National Guard to help fill the gaps. Current plans and thoughts are for future increased roles and participation in a variety of capacities. Samplings of some of these current thoughts are contained in the next part of this paper that provides a selected review and summary of the Reserve Component Employment Study 2005.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> "Army National Guard History", 29 April 1999, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 4 March 2000, available from <http://www.arng.ngb.army.mil/home/History/history.htm>. The English had relied on a militia to provide defense because for most of its history, England had no full-time, professional Army to do so.

## Notes

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. One of the better-known legacies from this period was “Roger’s Rangers”, “a regiment of ‘rangers’ created by Major Robert Rogers of New Hampshire who performed reconnaissance and conducted long-range raids against the French and their Indian allies.”

<sup>3</sup> Charles J. Gross, *The Air National Guard and the American Military Tradition* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995), 4-6.

<sup>4</sup> Article I, section 8, paragraphs 15, 16 and Amendment 2 respectively.

<sup>5</sup> Also used as the legal basis for conscription during the Civil war.

<sup>6</sup> Gross, *The Air National Guard*, 7.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> “Army National Guard History”, n.p.

<sup>9</sup> Gross, *The Air National Guard*, 8.

<sup>10</sup> Gross, *The Air National Guard*, 11; “Army National Guard History”, n.p.

<sup>11</sup> Based on the author’s experiences this “friction”, in various forms, is still in abundance today.

<sup>12</sup> “Army National Guard History”, n.p.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Gross, *The Air National Guard*, 16,25. Very likely NGUAS, formed in 1878, had a part in influencing this.

<sup>15</sup> Gross, *The Air National Guard*, 25. The 1903 Militia Act is also known as the “Dick Act”, after the Bill’s sponsor Rep. Charles W. Dick who was also a Major General in the Ohio National Guard.; Gross, *The Air National Guard*, 123. Because the Militia Act of 1792 and the National Defense Act of 1916 had referred specifically to "males", it took special legislation to allow women to join the Guard in later years.

<sup>16</sup> Quoted in Gross, 33, in Mahon, “Milton A. Record’s National Guard Legacy,” pp 31-32.

<sup>17</sup> Dr. Charles J. Gross, “The Air National Guard: Past, Present, and Future Prospects”, *Airpower Journal*, 10, no. 4 (Winter 1996): 62.

<sup>18</sup> LtGen John B. Conaway and Jeff Nelligan, *Call Out The Guard*, (Paducah, K.Y.: Turner Publishing Company, 1997), 50-55. The all-volunteer force also created some new dynamics for the National Guard and Reserve. Their members had always been volunteers, but without the imminent threat of a military draft, there was no longer that visible and strong incentive for young people to enlist. As a result, recruiting and retention began to suffer.

<sup>19</sup> Edward J. Philbin and James L. Gould, “The Guard and Reserve: In Pursuit of Full Integration,” in *The Guard and Reserve in The Total Force*, ed. Bennie J. Wilson III (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, May 1985), 47.

<sup>20</sup> Chairman of the Reserves Forces Policy Board, *Report of the Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board*, n.p.; on-line internet, 22 February 2000, available from [http://www.fas.org/man/docs/adr\\_00/rfpbstat.htm](http://www.fas.org/man/docs/adr_00/rfpbstat.htm); Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress 2000* (Washington, D.C.: Secretary of Defense), Chap 9, on-line, Internet, 22 February 2000, available from <http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr2000/>.

<sup>21</sup> Gross, *The Air National Guard*, 123-124.; Albert Robbert, William Williams, and Cynthia Cook, *Principles for Determining the Air Force Active/Reserve Mix*, RAND Report MR-1091-AF, 1999, Chap 3, on-line, Internet, 27 February 2000, available at <http://www.rand.org/publications/electronic/man.html>.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

## **Notes**

<sup>23</sup> “Army National Guard History”, n.p.

<sup>24</sup> Gross, *The Air National Guard*, 7, 16, 43-44.; “Army National Guard History”, n.p.

## **Part II**

### **Reserve Component Employment 2005 (RCE-05) Study**

In July of 1999, in compliance with the FY 2000-2005 Defense Planning Guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense, the DOD completed a one-year comprehensive collaborative effort on Reserve component employment. “The study examined how to make the RC easier to access and use, and how to better train, equip, and manage it to ensure effective mission fulfillment.”<sup>1</sup> The study identified and focused on three key areas particularly relevant to effective use of the RC within the Total Force concept (see groupings below). Within these areas the study suggested, recommended, or highlighted changes or identified issues for further study. According to Charles L. Cragin, assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs, “The RCE-05 study is an important step in an ongoing and rigorous process of identifying new and better ways of using the Reserve components.”<sup>2</sup> In the end the study and process serves to “generate a variety of new initiatives to enhance the role of the RC with respect to DoD missions and strengthened relations between the AC and RC.”<sup>3</sup>

### **Homeland Defense**

Missions in this general category would include: weapons of mass destruction (WMD) consequence management response, the protection of critical US infrastructure from physical or information operations attacks, or participation in a national missile defense program if established. With the Guard infrastructure already in place within each state, it makes sense to

try and use these assets for the physical security of some critical or key domestic infrastructure targets. Also, because of the Guard's familiarity and experience with responding to disasters such as floods and hurricanes, it is a logical extension to use the Guard in some sort of consequence management role.

Currently, there are 27 states that have, or are scheduled to have, WMD Civil Support Teams.<sup>4</sup> These teams will deploy rapidly, assist local first responders in determining the nature of an attack, provide medical and technical advice, and pave the way for the identification and arrival of follow-on state and federal military response assets. Since they will function in a state role, these teams can respond immediately without proceeding through any federal approval process.

In what might be considered one of the first steps in using RC assets for defense information protection, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) recently established a Joint Web Risk Assessment Cell (JWRAC) in Arlington, Virginia.<sup>5</sup> The JWRCA will employ reservists with operational military backgrounds and computer know-how. Working mostly on weekends when they would normally perform reserve duty, this 22 member RC team will be used to monitor and evaluate DOD Web sites to ensure sites do not compromise national security by revealing sensitive defense information. In the future, they may also work from alternate sites. This is a case where RC personnel are ideally suited for the task because of the pool of talented personnel who have current and high level skills with computers systems and information technology typically acquired and retained through their civilian careers.

Regarding RC participation in homeland defense with respect to a national missile defense system... missions that do not require continuing deployments are well suited for the RC. If a national missile defense system ever comes to fruition, the associated fixed installation sites and

routine activities should allow for relatively easy incorporation of RC personnel into manning and operating of such facilities.<sup>6</sup>

### **Smaller-Scale Contingencies (SSC)**

Since the end of the Cold War, demand for American military participation in smaller-scale contingencies (SSC) has remained high, and the increased use of the RC is being considered for two reasons. First, the AC force is experiencing difficulty doing “more with less” and the RC can provide some relief from the current operational tempo. Second, increased use translates to more opportunity for realistic training and skill broadening for RC personnel. Missions involving peacekeeping and augmentation to AC forces involved in SSC offer the greatest opportunities for increased participation and operating efficiencies regarding the use of RC forces. Though there are potentially significant limitations inherent in using RC forces (discussed later in this paper) for any extended SSC mission, the success and trust of using RC assets for peacekeeping is evidenced by the recent nine-month deployment of the 49<sup>th</sup> Armored Division to Bosnia. After four years of RC combat support and combat service support to the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, the National Guard’s 49<sup>th</sup> Armored Division from Texas recently assumed command of the U.S. Sector of the NATO-led Bosnia peacekeeping mission.<sup>7</sup> Peacekeeping, may in fact be, an area in which Guard troops excel. As citizen-soldiers they bring skills and a mindset from outside of the military into the scenario and may be better prepared to assist with the transition to nation building that typically follows the peacekeeping. The RCE-05 recommends a detailed study on using the RC for alternating rotation into interpositional peacekeeping operations.<sup>8</sup> The study also recommends better tracking and management of high demand/low density (HD/LD) assets contained within the RC, so they may be more effectively used in management of the high tempo demands associated with these assets. The Expeditionary Aerospace Force concept is

indorsed by the study as a way to increase RC participation in SSC through the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF). The study recommends continued refinement of the concept and acknowledges the criticality of RC participation in sustaining an adequate rotational pool of resources for AEF success.

## **Major Theater War (MTW)**

According to the RCE-05 study, increasing and optimizing the role and contributions of the RC within the Total Force is essential to fulfill the current defense strategy of being able to fight and win two MTWs in overlapping time frames.<sup>9</sup> The range of options examined to accomplish this includes a recommendation to better define the need or employment concept for a strategic reserve. In the Cold War period, a significant “reservoir of personnel” (planned for and included in the deliberate war plans) made for a strategic reserve to augment AC and RC forces in the event a “U.S.-Soviet conflict proved more challenging than war plans predicted.”<sup>10</sup> In this post Cold War period, existing operational plans (OPLAN) do not include apportioned forces for base generating or sustainment forces in the event the challenges of two MTWs in overlapping time frames are greater than anticipated. In fact, there is no official DOD definition that outlines the potential need or employment concept for a strategic reserve.<sup>11</sup> Any resulting study of this need will likely include planning for a greater dependence on the RC as a relatively low-cost “hedge” in a two MTW scenario.

Because of the heavy dependence on Army assets in a two MTW scenario, the need for select Army RC assets to achieve full combat proficiency quickly is paramount. National Guard brigades which are maintained at an enhanced level of readiness through increased prioritization for funding, equipment and manpower are designated as enhanced separate brigades (eSB). The RCE-05 calls for improvements to the post-mobilization training of eSBs and endorses further

developing the use of eSBs within the context of the Army's AC/RC Integrated Division concept. This concept essentially establishes an AC division headquarters to oversee the training and readiness of its associated three eSBs and may eventually evolve into a deployable division-size combat formation.<sup>12</sup>

On the Air Force side of the house, many options in the RCE-05 involved switching Air Force assets to the RC. Transferring bombers squadrons (one B-52 and one B-1B) to the RC has the potential for “saving \$54 million annually and easing the AC pilot shortage for these aircraft.”<sup>13</sup> Additionally, the low operational tempo associated with the mission is favorable with respect to availability and use of the RC to support the mission. The concept of switching AC fighter assets to RC units, “plus-up” of existing fighter units, establishing more associate units, and assigning RC personnel to active fighter wings were areas all recommended for further study.

The study ends with an assessment of a variety of recommendations regarding resource challenges for RC employment, which included “RC accessibility, utilization, mobilization, training, staffing and management.”<sup>14</sup> Interested readers should refer to the RCE-05, Annex G, for a further assessment of these issues. In the final conclusion, the Study should serve as an effective catalyst for initiatives enhancing any future role of the RC within the Total Force, and allowing for better integration of the RC over the range of DoD missions in the future. In the next part of this paper, some ways in which the National Guard is being used in a less traditional military role will be presented.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Department of Defense, *Reserve Component Employment Study 2005*, Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1999), 1.

<sup>2</sup> Quoted in Peter Grier, “New Roles for the Guard and Reserve,” *Air Force Magazine*, November 1999, 50.

## **Notes**

<sup>3</sup> Reserve Component Employment Study 2005, 29.

<sup>4</sup> Chris Maddaloni, "Homeland Defense," *National Guard*, January 2000, 24-25.

<sup>5</sup> Douglas J. Gillert, "Reserve Sets Up Web Security Cell", 11 March 1999, n.p. ; on-line, Internet, 27 February 2000, available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/dod031199.html>.

<sup>6</sup> Reserve Component Employment Study 2005, 7.

<sup>7</sup> Chris Maddaloni, "A Bigger Piece of Peacekeeping," *National Guard*, January 2000, 18.

<sup>8</sup> Reserve Component Employment Study 2005, 10. Similar to the Multinational Force and Observer (MFO) mission in the Sinai.

<sup>9</sup> Reserve Component Employment Study 2005, 14.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 19.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 15.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 25.

## **Part III**

### **Nontraditional Military Applications**

#### **Nation Building Role - The National Guard State Partnership Program**

The National Guard has the ability to capitalize on the unique engagement capabilities of their citizen-soldiers to help shape the international environment in support of US objectives by strengthening civil-military relationships and contributing to the promotion of regional stability through its State Partnership Program (SPP). The program began in December 1992 when the Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB), lead an interagency team to Lithuania (the first visit in fifty years by an American official at this level), as part of a US European Command military-to-military contact program.<sup>1</sup> Since then, the National Guard's State Partnership Program has made great strides in fostering relations with former Eastern Block countries and the program has recently been expanded to the US Southern Command Theater. Additionally, representatives from several African and Asian nations have expressed interest in participating in the program.

The National Guard State Partnership Program links US states and emerging democracies of the partnered countries within the associated regions for the purpose of improving bilateral relations with the United States. It does this through ties between the State Governor and State National Guard with the Ministry of Defense, government agencies, and soldiers of the partner nation. A primary focus of the State Partnership Program is to convey and reinforce in the

partner nations the concept that the proper role of the military in a democratic society is one of military subordination to civilian authority and of military support to civil authorities.

...The National Guard goal is to demonstrate, through the example of the citizen-soldier, the role of the military in a democratic society... By utilizing National Guardsmen in their dual roles as citizen-soldiers, the partner nation's military leaders are encountering highly trained and cost-effective members of the United States Armed Forces. Guardsmen serve as role models in making a compelling case for the ideals of democracy, professionalism, and deference to civilian authority. They also demonstrate the necessity and economy of Reserve Components with the ability to react immediately to civil and military emergencies... The purpose of this program is to build long-standing institutional affiliations and people-to-people relationships with nations while establishing democratic military organizations.<sup>2</sup>

The program's goals are indicative of an evolving international affairs mission for the National Guard, and demonstrate how the Guard, through the SPP, actively supports the National Military Strategy's mandate to shape the international security environment.

## **Domestic Assistance Roles**

Most people are fairly familiar with the traditional role and use of the Guard to quell civil disturbances, and to assist in disaster response. However, they may not be as familiar with some of the other programs that the Guard is involved in as it endeavors to mitigate some of the internal problems within our society today.

### **Counterdrug Role**

Beginning in the '70s, the Guard took its first foray into the counterdrug role by providing helicopters for marijuana detection and seizure in Hawaii. In the early and latter time period of the 1980s, Congress approved legislation that permitted use of the Guard to assist in domestic drug control efforts. The Guard became officially tasked with supporting the US national drug-control strategy with the passage of the 1989 National Defense Authorization Act. That law "...authorized the Secretary of Defense to provide \$40 million for state governor's plans to

expand the use of the National Guard in support of law enforcement drug interdiction and counterdrug activities while in a state status (Title 32).<sup>3</sup> The role of the Guard in support of this mission has significantly increased since then and currently provides support to thousands of local, state and federal law enforcement agencies and anti-drug coalitions.<sup>4</sup> Additionally, the Guard has a Counterdrug Coordinator (CDC) and a Drug Demand Reduction Administrator (DDRA) positioned in every state whom are trained to provide effective supply and drug demand reduction support at the local grass roots level. Besides providing technical operational skills (e.g., linguists, reconnaissance/observation capabilities) to the program, the Guard can also provide counterdrug related training at no cost to Law Enforcement agency personnel.<sup>5</sup>

Finally, it is important to note that every mission conducted within the counterdrug program is conducted under the control and approval of the respective state governors, and are tied to the support of these following goals established in 1998 by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP).

Goal 1: Motivate America's youth to reject illegal drugs and substance abuse.

Goal 2: Increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence.

Goal 3: Reduce health, welfare, and crime costs resulting from illegal drug use.

Goal 4: Shield America's air, land and sea frontiers from the drug threat.

Goal 5: Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.<sup>6</sup>

While these counterdrug assignments fill a critical role in dealing with the transnational threat of drug trafficking as discussed in the National Strategic Survey (NSS), the counterdrug role also plays an essential role in fulfilling the mission of the Guards youth assistance activities.

## Youth Assistance Programs

ChalleNGe is a 22-week, quasi-military residential program staffed by National Guard members that began as a pilot program (National Guard Civilian Youth Opportunities Program) in 1992. The purpose of the pilot program was twofold; "... to see if life skills and employment potential of high school dropouts could be significantly improved if subjected to military-based training involving supervised work experience in community service and conservation projects," and to determine if it was cost feasible for the Guard to provide the training.<sup>7</sup> The program is considered to be highly successful, and in 1997, received permanent authorization and funding from Congress for operations. The current program targets at-risk, drug-free youths (between 16-18 years of age), who have dropped out of high school. The goals are to assist the youths with attainment of a General Education Document (GED) or high school diploma, and to help them acquire life skills centered about "good citizenship, productiveness, and positive community contribution."<sup>8</sup> In other words, the purpose of the program is to instill some values, teach some life skills, and provide the education necessary to be a responsible citizen and productive member of society.

Starbase is another program that endeavors to assist the nations youth but one that takes a science and math based approach. This program (established in 1989) and developed in part by Brigadier General David Arends, Commander of the Selfridge ANG, is designed for youths in grades Kindergarten through 12<sup>th</sup> grade, and "exposes these school students (and teachers) to math and science applications through experiments in aviation and space-related fields."<sup>9</sup> In addition to a curriculum focusing on science and math, the program emphasizes personal development and resistance to negative influences of substance and alcohol abuse.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> LtGen John B. Conaway and Jeff Nelligan, *Call Out The Guard*, (Paducah, K.Y.: Turner Publishing Company, 1997), 219-222.

<sup>2</sup> National Guard Bureau, International Affairs Division, "Doctrine for National Guard Cooperative Efforts With Other Nations", n.p.; on-line, Internet, 14 April, 2000, available from [http://www.ang.af.mil/ngbia/Documents/NGB\\_Doctrine.htm](http://www.ang.af.mil/ngbia/Documents/NGB_Doctrine.htm).

<sup>3</sup> National Guard Bureau, Counterdrug Division, "The National Guard's Call to Action," n.p.; on-line, Internet, 17 April 2000, available from <http://cdweb.ngb.army.mil/devnew/cd/cd1.htm>.

<sup>4</sup> Conaway and Nelligan, 235. In 1994, Congress approved 164 million for 6,000 Guard personnel to assist 2,000 various agencies.

<sup>5</sup> Pennsylvania National Guard, Counterdrug Program, "Mission Statement," n.p.; on-line, Internet, 15 April 2000, available from <http://counterdrug.org/pacdo/mission.htm>.

<sup>6</sup> National Guard Bureau, Counterdrug Division, *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> Department of Defense, Civil-Military Programs, "National Guard [ChalleNGe] Program", n.p.; on-line, Internet, 13 March 2000, available from <http://raweb.osd.mil/initiatives/challenge.htm>.

<sup>8</sup> Department of Defense, Civil-Military Programs, *Ibid.*; Conaway and Nelligan, 233-234.

<sup>9</sup> Conaway and Nelligan, 234.; Starbase Vermont, "Homepage," n.p.; on-line, Internet, 22 February 2000, available from <http://www.starbasevt.org/goals.htm>.

## **Part IV**

### **Social Perspectives**

*"Men accustomed to their arms and their liberties will never endure the yoke."*

-Unknown

The changing culture of our society may be the biggest factor in determining what and how large a role Reserve Forces will play in any future scenarios. Within a democratic nation, the level of public support for the nation's armed forces dictates and constrains the amount and kind of resources that military forces are given to work with. Defense budgets are a prime example of this. As a society we are asked to support a standing military force capable to counter the enemy threat, and protect the homeland. Without the perception of a credible threat to our homeland, we as citizens tend to opt for allocating funds towards social programs and other economic growth programs beneficial to the prosperity and well being of our nation. Efforts directed towards achieving the objectives and commitments established by the National Security Strategy performed by the active duty military forces have consequently come to increasingly utilize the Reserve forces to mitigate "peacetime" budgets. In fact, this is the dominant trend of change present in the military structure today.<sup>1</sup>

The mindset of the population regarding military forces has changed as much as the demographics of the United States and the perceptions of threats to our nation have over the last century. A recent poll indicates the military enjoys a very high level of trust and confidence

from the general public.<sup>2</sup> Yet this author would be more inclined to agree with the statement that in this post-Cold War period the public has become “if not outright skeptical, then certainly apathetic and ambivalent about the military and military matters.”<sup>3</sup> These attitudes could certainly adversely affect the RC as well as the total military force in terms of retention and program support. While addressing the National Chamber of Commerce last June, Lt Gen Russell C. Davis, chief of the National Guard Bureau, offered a prime example of how the changing demographics within our society has the potential for affecting the National Guard.

It may be very hard for a boss or a first-line supervisor to understand a reservist's commitment, particularly as the boss is less and less likely to have been a veteran today. For example, during World War II, one American in 15 wore a uniform. By the time of Vietnam, it had risen to 1 in 23. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm you had to add in the Guard and Reserve to bring the ratio up to 1 in 90. Today, even using Total Force numbers, that ratio is nearly 1 in 120.<sup>4</sup>

On the other hand there are some employers who do not mind the absence of an employee, especially if away for local community disaster/emergency response. The rationale is that it's for the good of his community and business. This makes a point: The National Guard in its State role is a community and a business asset in times of emergency.

In fact, with the increasing participation of the military in disaster assistance and humanitarian type (and other factors, e.g., increasing civilian component of the military), Moskos and Burke suggest that in this postmodern period, there will be less distinction of the difference between the military and civil society. As Mosko and Burke state in their article:

The military will be called upon to perform many nonmilitary functions while it retains a special responsibility for national defense. And the public will begin to recognize that both military and civilian service have some sort of civic equivalence.<sup>5</sup>

Throughout his tenure at the Department of Defense, Secretary Cohen has emphasized the importance of strengthening the bonds between America and its military. Absent the draft, the Guard may well be the last significant link between the military and the people of our society.

With enough involvement and presence within the community and the nation as a whole, the Guard could foster an increase in awareness of the military and help affect a positive change in the attitudes of our society regarding U.S. military forces and the ideas of civic responsibilities.

### **Notes**

<sup>1</sup> Charles C. Moskos and James Burk, "The Postmodern Military," in *The Adaptive Military*, ed. James Burk (New Brunswick, N.J.; Transaction Publishers, 1998), 171.

<sup>2</sup> C.J. Chivers, "Military fights an imaginary rift with the public," USA Today, 14 September, 1999, 17A.

<sup>3</sup> Moskos and Burk, 174.

<sup>4</sup> Lt Gen Russell C. Davis, chief, National Guard Bureau, remarks at the National Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D.C., June 1999.

<sup>5</sup> Moskos and Burk, 176.

## **Part V**

### **Final Thoughts**

*This is not your father's National Guard anymore...*

Major General Rees, Vice-Chief, NGB

The reserve components of today truly do constitute a highly capable, multipurpose force evolving, in a very dynamic fashion, to meet the changing requirements of a new period. A period in which conventional views about the form and function of the RC are being significantly changed from those held just a decade ago, lest from the very beginning. They are being used, and considered for use, across a broader spectrum of employment than ever before and are relied upon as a major contributor within the Total Force. They have demonstrated the capability to perform in an increasing and widening range of functions and missions, and certainly provide an economic, flexible response capability to our military force structure to more effectively deal with the requirements and demands of the ever-dynamic international security environment. The Total Force concept is indeed alive and well and on very solid ground based on past and current performance through the recent decade. As evidenced by RCE-05, our government and military leaders believe in further integration of the RC, and continuing efforts towards maximizing potential efficiencies inherent within the Total Force construct. Therefore, we should expect the RC to continue to make new and important contributions to our nation's security.

However, there are considerations and challenges that go along with the success story of the Guard and their role within the Total Force. Most significantly, the social forces that come into play will ultimately determine how our nation decides to support and fund any continued or future use of the nation's Reserve Forces. There are also longstanding continuous conflicts of political and military interests inherent in any considerations regarding future use of the RC and the proper role and function of these forces.<sup>1</sup> Collectively, our society and policymakers need to decide on how to best mitigate these conflicts of interest and allocate resources towards the defense needs of the nation.

Currently our nation's military is in a period of time in which our military force structure is in transition from that of a modern military force to that of a postmodern military force. That is, we are moving away from the model of a massed armed force, based on conscription, to that of a smaller voluntary professional force standing force which relies on reserve forces to accomplish most of its missions.<sup>2</sup> In some ways, it seems that the Guard and Reserve are being used because there is no one else to do the job during this time of change and reevaluation of our nation's force structure requirements and associated attempts to define "the threat". Military planners are still looking and planning on greater use of the reserve components, but this does not really alter the fundamental equation of our military attempting to do more with less and "cost-sharing" the bill with the RC.

Are we running the risk of overusing the RC? In 1987 the Guard and Reserves provided about one million man-days of support to our active component counterparts for deployments, and contingencies, overseas and here at home. For the last three years, the annual rate of operations has been running approximately 13 million man-days.<sup>3</sup> This activity level is the result of several factors. One factor is the overall downsizing of our military with the end of the Cold

War. Second is the high level of reliability and proficiency of the Guard and reserve forces, and a third factor is the escalating level of worldwide activity due to the current National Security Strategy. A significant consideration with any increased use of the RC is the question of how much personnel and operational tempo can increase before adversely effecting retention and readiness within the RC. According to Lt Gen Davis, chief of the National Guard Bureau,

There is growing awareness that we are "close to the edge" in abusing and overburdening our civilian employers as we try to meet the demands of our pace of military operations. ESGR [A national committee for employer support of the Guard and Reserve] has anecdotal evidence of the strain between our two institutions; the military and industry, which have historically been so mutually supportive.<sup>4</sup>

Employer support is, and will remain critical to retention, and accessibility of RC if we are to successfully continue using the RC in its current capacity. This is especially so for any planned future increases in tasking. Currently there are three bills in Congress that if approved, will provide some degree of tax credit to employers with employees absent on active duty.<sup>5</sup>

The one continuous refrain heard throughout the peaks and valleys of the Guard's history has always centered about concerns regarding force structure, modernization, and retention. In a recent magazine article, Charles Cragin, principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs, stated that a few years ago, when the Guard was used less often for SSC, retention was a more serious issue. But [now] the more the Guard is used, the greater the recruiting and retention incentive.<sup>6</sup> Based on the author's personal experiences, and the sentiments voiced by other members of my flying unit about the seemingly ever-increasing operational tempo, the author believes he could easily make a case to the contrary regarding this last statement. In fact, recognition by decision makers of a problem in overextending deployment commitments of the RC may be evident in the their recent decision to limit the overseas deployment length for non-combat tours of RC down to 180 days.<sup>7</sup>

Naturally, to provide appropriate equipment and training, funding and resources will have to be commensurate with any increased expectations in use of the RC, especially for any new roles that require a unit to “re-mission” or restructure to accomplish them. The need to continually evaluate potentially new roles, and adapt as necessary, has been the hallmark of the Guard, particularly the Air National Guard (ANG). Indeed, the integration level of Air Force Reserve Component into the Total Force is the standard to which other services look to emulate, and is a tribute to the senior leadership that has guided the ANG since its inception.<sup>8</sup> But, whether the same level of integration will be achieved by the other services remains to be seen, especially within the Army National Guard (ARNG).<sup>9</sup> Perhaps further integration and mission tasks will be only marginally achievable when contrasted against the risks of potential detriment in retention and readiness.

Regardless, the debate concerning “seamless integration” of the RC must continue within our nation, amongst our political, military and educational leaders, and especially so among us as citizens, as to what really constitutes the best use of our limited assets in providing for the defense needs of our country. After all, we the people, and this nation, are the ones who will benefit.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Conaway and Nelligan, 135-139. As in the case when Governor Joseph Brennan of Maine prohibited deployment of 48 Maine Army Guardsmen to Honduras resulting in several other governors stating similar positions. The situation eventually required resolution by decision through the Supreme Court.; David T. Fautua, “How the Guard and Reserve Will Fight in 2025,” *Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly*, 29, no. 1 (Spring 1999), 127,129,131. Some arising as a result of these AC/RC institutional misperceptions within our military.

<sup>2</sup> Moskos and Burke, 171.

<sup>3</sup> Command Sgt. Maj. Colin Younger, “The National Guard and Reserve in 2000 and Beyond”, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 27 February 1999, available from [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2000/n02282000\\_20002285.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2000/n02282000_20002285.html).

## Notes

<sup>4</sup> Lt Gen Russell C. Davis, chief, National Guard Bureau, remarks at the National Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D.C., June 9 1999.

<sup>5</sup> *National Guard*, February 2000, 31.; H.R. 712, 713, 803.

<sup>6</sup> *National Guard*, January 2000, 20.

<sup>7</sup> "U.S. Army Shortens Active Tours for Guard, Reserve"; 6 March 2000, *Reuters News Release*, on-line, Yahoo, 6 March 2000.

<sup>8</sup> Conaway and Nelligan, 142.

<sup>9</sup> Fautua, In general.

## **Appendix A**

### **Reserve Forces Policy Board**

Creation of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) was accomplished through Congress in 1952 when they passed the Armed Forces Act of 1952. The act established the RFPB to serve as the principal policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the Reserve components. Prior to the establishment of the RFPB, there was a Committee on Civilian Components appointed by the first Secretary of Defense, Mr. James Forrestal. This was a result of Executive Order No. 10007, October 15, 1947 directing the Secretary of Defense to take every practicable step for the strengthening of all elements of the Reserve components of the Armed Services. As it stands today the RFPB is comprised of 24 members whom in addition to their military expertise, represent a wide range of industrial, business, professional, and civic experience. It is incumbent upon the RFPB members to bring forward to the Board any issues they feel have policy implications which affect the National Guard and Reserve. As part of this responsibility the Board is required to submit through the Secretary of Defense, to the President and Congress an annual report. The report is to provide credible advice and information to the Secretary of Defense and Congress so that the decisions made affecting the Reserve components enhance the capability of the total force to meet national security requirements.

## ***Glossary*** □

AAF	Army Air Force
AC	Active Component
AEF	Air Expeditionary Force
ANG	Air National Guard
ARNG	Army National Guard
DoD	Department of Defense
HD/LD	High Demand/Low Density
MTW	Major Theater War
NGAUS	National Guard Association of the United States
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NSS	National Security Strategy
RC	Reserve Component (National Guard or Reserve)
RCE-05	Reserve Component Employment Study 2005
RFPB	Reserve Forces Policy Board
USAF	United States Air Force
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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